For the last 70 years, the initials ‘HMNZS’ stood for Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship, as Queen Elizabeth II held the throne.   Now, with His Majesty King Charles III as Sovereign, our Navy fleet units receive a change in designation to His Majesty’s New Zealand Ship.  



The Republic of Korea Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Kim Seung-kyum said on September 19th that the military will consider acquiring an aircraft carrier that is larger than the current CVX design if a carrier capable fighter is developed domestically. “The Minister of National Defence said that a light aircraft carrier does have utility. However, given that the aircraft carried on board will be designed domestically, he said that the Ministry of National Defence is re-evaluating aspects of the program.” CVX has become a hotly debated issue in recent years. Some domestic observers have called it a “sitting duck” and requested the acquisition of a bigger medium-sized carrier. In South Korea, an aircraft carrier with a displacement of over 60,000 tons is considered to be “medium-sized.” The CVX program evolved from the Landing Platform eXperimental (LPX) program that saw the Republic of Korean Navy acquire its largest vessels so far, the Dokdo class amphibious assault ships.


The Hetman Sahaidachny was the pride of the Ukrainian Navy, she had a 100mm deck gun, smaller guns, anti-submarine grenade launchers, torpedo tubes, and a helicopter. As the Russian invasion of Ukraine continues, the Ukrainian Navy’s flagship Hetman Sahaidachny (U 130) was seen in a partially submerged state. According to reports, Ukraine has sunk its own frigate in an attempt to prevent Russia from securing a major propaganda win. As there are fears that Russia may capture the port city Odessa, Ukraine does not want Russia to lay its hands on the ship as a major battlefield trophy.


U.S. 7th Fleet’s Task Force (CTF) 75 and Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) successfully retrieved the F-35C Lightning II aircraft which crashed earlier this year in the South China Sea. The F-35C Lightning II, assigned to Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 2, crashed while USS CARL VINSON (CVN 70) was conducting routine flight operations in the South China Sea on Jan. 24. The wreckage was recovered from a depth of approximately 12,400-feet (3780 mtr) by a team from CTF 75 and the NAVSEA’s Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV) embarked on the diving support construction vessel (DSCV) PICASSO


Austal Australia has delivered the 13th Guardian-class Patrol Boat (GCPB) to the Australian Department of Defence, according to the company's release. The vessel, NUSHIP Francis Agwi, was then gifted by the Australian Government to the Papua New Guinea Defence Force at a certificate signing ceremony held at Austal’s shipyard in Henderson, Western Australia.

Twelve Pacific Island nations including Papua New Guinea, Fiji, the Federated States of Micronesia, Tonga, Solomon Islands, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Palau, Samoa, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Timor-Leste will receive the vessels through to 2023. The Pacific Patrol Boat Replacement Project supports more than 200 direct jobs at Austal Australia and more than 200 indirect jobs nationally through Australian businesses contracted by Austal. Austal Australia’s expanded service centre in Cairns, incorporating a 1,200 tonne (80 metre LOA) slipway and a 1,120-tonne mobile boat hoist, continues to provide in-service support to the growing Guardian-class Patrol Boat fleet; with more than 100 people now employed in a variety of engineering and sustainment roles in the Far North Queensland city. The 39.5 metre steel monohull patrol boat – designed, constructed and sustained by Austal Australia – is based on a proven design platform that has included the 38 metre Bay-class, 56 metre Armidale-class and 58 metre Cape class patrol boats that are in service with the Australian Border Force and Royal Australian Navy.


Russian and Chinese warships conducted the first ever joint patrol in the western part of the Pacific Ocean on October 17- 23, Russia’s Defence Ministry said. “The joint patrolling demonstrated the state flags of Russia and China, maintained peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region, and protected facilities of both countries’ maritime economic activity. During the patrol, the group of warships sailed Tsugaru Strait for the first time,” The Russian Navy was represented in the joint naval taskforce of ten warships by the Pacific Fleet forces that included the Marshal Krylov measuring ship, ADMIRAL TRIBUTS and the ADMIRTAL PANTELEYEV large antisubmarine warfare ships, and the ALDAR TSYDENZHAPOV and the GROMKY corvettes of project 20380. The Chinese Navy was represented by the Kunming and the Nanchang destroyers, the QINZHOU and the LUZHOU corvettes, and the DONGPINGHU supply ship. The Russian and Chinese sailors practiced joint tactical manoeuvring and held a series of drills. The warships had covered a total distance of over 1,700 nautical miles in their joint patrol. As reported earlier, the Russian and Chinese Navies held the Joint Sea 2021 three-day naval manoeuvres in the Sea of Japan.

Source: Naval News

China’s turn to the outside world and its growing dependence on maritime commerce coincided with the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the start of a period in which the United States enjoyed unchallenged command of the seas. The confluence of these developments created a vulnerability of which Chinese naval strategists and political leaders were painfully aware, but about which—at first—they could do very little. U.S. power, especially naval power, also stood in the way of Beijing achieving its regional goals of absorbing Taiwan and asserting its maritime claims in the East and South China Seas. Despite these dangers, in keeping with its overall strategy, the Communist Party regime chose, in Deng Xiaoping’s words, to “hide its capabilities and bide its time,” relying on the prospect of mutual economic gain to check the aggressive impulses of the United States and its allies while taking advantage of the opportunities presented by the West’s engagement to build up all the elements of its own comprehensive national power.

Since the early 1990s, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) planners have sought to develop weapons and operational concepts with which to counter any future U.S. effort to project power into the western Pacific. Beijing has put in place an extensive ant access/area-denial complex: a combination of reconnaissance systems and conventional precision-strike weapons capable of targeting fixed bases and mobile platforms at ever-increasing ranges from China’s coasts. These are backed by, among other things, anti-satellite and cyber capabilities designed to disrupt U.S. and allied command and control, an integrated air-defence system to protect the Chinese mainland, and a modernizing, mobile nuclear force meant to deter potential attackers while broadening the array of options available to China’s leaders. Beijing also has used unconventional means creatively, building islands and deploying a sizable seaborne militia to strengthen its position and assert its maritime claims. All this activity is clearly intended to deter U.S. intervention in a possible future conflict off China’s coasts and to delay and defeat it should deterrence fail. In the long run, Beijing evidently hopes to “win without fighting,” undermining the credibility of U.S. security guarantees, weakening its alliances, and clearing the way for China to resume its rightful place as the preponderant power in eastern Eurasia. China’s leaders obviously would prefer to achieve their objectives in the Indo-Pacific through the incremental accumulation of positional advantages and without the costs and risks of a direct clash of arms. But they also are acquiring the forces and developing the doctrine they believe will give them the best chance of winning, should war become necessary. Unfortunately, Beijing’s preparations are pushing it toward a posture in which the chances of success would depend heavily on pre-emption.

In the western Pacific, China is building the capabilities necessary to carry out massed conventional precision strikes on the bases, forces, and reconnaissance and communication systems of the United States and its regional allies. The PLA’s theory of victory appears to envision a first strike that would effectively knock the United States out of the theatre in the opening stages, accompanied by the seizure of key maritime terrain and establishment of a defensive perimeter along the first island chain, after which Beijing would presumably depend on economic suasion and threats of escalation to bring U.S. allies to terms and to discourage Washington from continuing the war.

Source: US Naval Institute